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Chinese Strategy Towards Europe: 
The Belt and Road Initiative and 17 + 1 Strategy – 
What Does It Mean for the EU and Central 
and Eastern Europe?
Abstract
Several projects like the Silk Road have been developed by different 
countries in the post-1991 period, but there is only one that had a 
tremendous global impact: the “One Belt One Road” (Belt and Road) 
Initiative developed by China. This project was fi rst announced by the 
Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to Central Asia in 2013, and 
has subsequently had a tremendous global, regional and national effect. The 
Belt and Road Initiative not only covers almost the entire Asian continent, 
but also a large geographical area that extends from East Africa to Europe. 
Through this project China aims to promote common development and 
welfare sharing among all countries along the Belt and Road routes, to 
establish mutual political trust between China and these countries, to more 
effectively connect transportation networks among regions and cities along 
the routes, and to establish cultural contact between societies. Accordingly, 
China wants to put its development process on a planned and solid basis by 
increasing its global impact in the economic, political, and cultural fi elds.
Keywords: China, International Relations, European Union, 17 + 1 
Strategy
Introduction
Offi cial relations between the EU and China started on May 6, 1975. 
After this date, a trade agreement was signed between China and the EU 
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on May 2, 1978, wherein the two parties assigned the most privileged 
nation status to one another.1 The fi rst scientifi c-technological cooperation 
projects between China and the EU were launched in 1983. The Agreement 
on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic 
Community and the People’s Republic of China was then signed on May 
21, 1985 and remains the main legal framework for EU–China relations 
to this day. Subsequently the EU Delegation was opened in Beijing in 
1988.2 Throughout the 1980s several commercial cooperation agreements 
were signed between the parties and multinational European fi rms 
invested in China, which contributed to the Chinese economy’s process 
of transformation into an economy focused on consumption, service, 
and technology. From the beginning of the 1990s commercial relations 
between the EU and China started to revive, while their political and 
diplomatic relations simultaneously began to institutionalize. The 
fi rst summit between the EU and China was held in 1998 and a total 
of 21 summits, including the April 2019 Summit, have now been held. 
Furthermore, a comprehensive strategic partnership between the two 
parties was announced in 2002.
Economic Relations 
between the European Union (EU) and China
Since the 2008 Eurozone Debt Crisis, China–EU economic relations, 
regarding both trade and direct capital investments, have drawn the 
attention of world public opinion together, as have their social and political 
outcomes. Hence, foreign investments toward the EU originating in 
China increased signifi cantly after the “2008 Debt Crisis”. Furthermore, 
in addition to trade- and direct-capital investments economic initiatives 
using capital of Chinese-origin through government enterprises and 
private companies have also become increasingly prominent in different 
sectors. Today, dialogue and cooperation mechanisms exist between the 
two parties across more than 50 sectors, including trade, environment, 
energy, and education; it was within this context that contact groups 
for the EU–China High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue and the 
China–EU High-Level Strategic Dialogue were established in 2008 and 
2010, respectively. The economic relations between China and the EU 
changed to incorporate a new dimension within the framework of free 
1  J.A.G. Roberts, The Complete History of China, Sutton Publishing, Basingstoke 
2003, p. 460.
2  O. Griese, EU–China relations an assessment by the communications of the Euro-
pean Union, “Asia Europe Journal”, no. 4/2006, pp. 545–547.
123
E. Akdemir, Chinese Strategy Towards Europe…
trade when China became a member of the World Trade Organization 
(WHO) in 2011, which increased the China-EU bilateral trade volume. 
Today, one fi fth of all EU imports and one tenth of all EU exports are 
sent to or from China. The trade volume between China and the EU was 
valued at around USD 615.1 billion in 2014 and USD 700 billion in 2015. 
In addition, 17.5% of the foreign direct investments originating from 
China – which reached a total of USD 200 billion in 2016 – are canalized 
to EU countries.3 As part of its “Go Out” (zouchuqu) policy, China has 
started buying Eurobonds and making huge infrastructural investments 
in the Euro Zone. Subsequently, Chinese state-owned enterprises and 
private companies have thereby gained infl uence in different areas in 
many EU countries. These investments increased by 77% between 2015 
and 2016 when they reached 36.5 billion USD, comprising 4% of the EU’s 
total foreign direct investment stock at the year of 2016.4 In this context, 
imports between the two parties – which amounted to 345 billion euros 
in 2016 – increased by 8.6% in 2017, reaching a total of 375 billion euros, 
with the EU running an import defi cit of 176 billion euros with China. 
According to data from 2018, the People’s Republic of China is the EU’s 
second largest trade partner after the USA, and the EU is China’s largest 
trading partner, with the two parties trading over 1 billion euros a day 
on average.5 Additionally, China has invested billions of euros in EU 
countries in recent years, investment that amounted to 37 billion euros 
in 2016, 18 billion euros in 2018, and 12 billion euros in 2019. In addition 
to capital investments, consumer products and services became another 
main target of Chinese investors in 2019. Chinese companies have also 
started to accelerate their research and development (R&D) cooperation 
with companies, universities, and governments in the EU.6 China’s 
foreign investments in the EU directly affect the employment of around 
eight million people throughout the EU, and constitute a very important 
part of its economy. The EU and its member states also intend to benefi t 
3  Trade in Goods with China, European, European Commission, http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113366.pdf (access 10.04.2020).
4  T. Hanemann ve M. Huotari, Record Flows and Growing Imbalances: Chinese 
Investment in Europe in 2016, The Mercator Institute for China Studies and The Rhodium 
Group, January, 2017, http://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/RHG_Merics_COF-
DI_EU_2016.pdf (access 10.04.2020).
5  Investment, Countries and Regions, China, European Commission, https://
ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/ (access 10.04.2020).
6  A. Kratz, M. Huotari, T. Hanemann, R. Arcesati, Chinese FDI in Europe:2019 
UPDATE Special Topic: Research Collaborations, Mercator Institute for China Studies 
(MERICS), April 2020, p. 7, https://www.merics.org/sites/default/fi les/2020-04/MERICS-
Rhodium%20Group_COFDI-Update-2020%20%282%29.pdf (access 10.04.2020).
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from China’s market and economic power. These realities and intentions 
between China and the EU signify that China–EU relations will gain 
a new dimension in the future. In the light of these data, the EU wishes 
to take its trade relations with China one step further through the signing 
of a free trade agreement. However, China is not yet ready to enter into 
such an agreement. Today, the project that will ensure the incremental 
diversifi cation, as well as the increase in and balance of trade relations 
between the two parties is undoubtedly the Belt and Road Initiative, an 
initiative devised and led by China. This is because, as is discussed in 
other parts of the study, this project targets and includes many economic 
potentials, plans, and major investments via both land and sea routes that 
can be shaped with China’s economic leap forward toward the EU.
China’s population of 1.4 billion and the EU’s population of 450 million 
not only comprise the two largest global markets according to purchasing 
power, but they also comprise one third of the total gross national product 
globally. As no signifi cant geopolitical confl ict exists between the EU and 
China, who adopt the principle of multilateralism regarding international 
relations,7 this places international trade relations between the EU and 
China at the centre of EU–China bilateral relations. Accordingly, China’s 
initiative provides it with an opportunity to increase its global trade 
impact and better balance its position with the EU, its biggest trade and 
strategic partner, while also providing the EU with the opportunity to 
upraise its own economic indicators.
Modern Silk Road: The Belt and Road Initiative: 
The Spirit and Meaning of the Initiative
To understand the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the ‘New (Modern) 
Silk Road’, it is fi rst necessary to understand China’s current foreign 
policy. Today, Chinese foreign policy is based on the reorganization of 
the international order, as well as the establishment of an economic, 
political, and cultural system outside the global economic, political, and 
cultural system – currently led by Western countries, especially the USA 
– by establishing organizations and mechanisms to substitute existing 
international institutions. In this respect, China opposes both the global 
production and management understanding of the Western states, especially 
the USA, as well as the economic, political, and cultural system envisaged 
by these Western states across the world. China advocates the preservation 
7  China’s Policy Paper on the EU: Deepen the China–EU Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership for Mutual Benefi t and Win-win Cooperation 2014/04/02, https://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzcs/t1143406.shtml (access 8.04.2020).
125
E. Akdemir, Chinese Strategy Towards Europe…
of the differences of civilizations based on the principle of equality within 
the international system. Therefore, China’s opposition is not focused on 
the elimination of US and European states, their values, or their systems. 
Rather, China’s opposition is therefore against the hegemonic behaviours 
and policies of these states. Today, China rejects the idea that it is only the 
USA or the European states that are positioned as the cultural, scientifi c, 
technological, and administrative leaders of the world. Due to this thesis, 
China is now trying to show the USA and the European states that it also 
represents a leading civilization and set of values. It does not accept that 
the values of the Western world represent the only valid value system 
globally and refuses the approach that the economic and political order 
imposed by the West is universally true and valid. Accordingly, the Belt 
and Road Initiative is a political, economic, and cultural project for the 
establishment of alternative China-based organizations and mechanisms 
to the existing Western-based global institutional structure. In this 
context, we can also consider the project to be a geopolitical, geostrategic, 
geoeconomic, and geocultural challenge to the status quo. Within the 
scope of the initiative, it is necessary to evaluate the creation of new 
transportation routes and trade infrastructures among Europe, Asia, and 
Africa according to the perspective of this transformative thesis. In this 
frame, China has both geopolitical and economic motivations behind the 
initiative. This could be also described as a more assertive China.
China’s economic volume comprised 30% of global economic volume in 
the 1820s, something that attracted the attention of the colonial European 
states, which subsequently began to pursue colonial policies toward China. 
These policies, which were shaped both by internal rebellions as well as 
exploitation by colonial powers within China itself, marked the “Century 
of Humiliation” for the Chinese. This period, which started with China’s 
defeat against Britain in the First Opium War (1839–1842) resulted in 
“unequal agreements” and in the handing over Hong Kong’s rule to the 
British. The “Century of Humiliation” humiliation only ended in 1949 
when the Communist Party founded the People’s Republic of China and 
so, in this sense, China’s “One Belt One Road” Initiative also forms the 
antithesis of the “hundred years of national humiliation”.
It is necessary within this context to mention the understanding of 
domestic policy and economic planning in China. China’s policy and 
economic planning is traditionally based on a medium- and long-term 
approach; accordingly, China’s current and future policy, as well as its 
economic planning and development process, have a time horizon of 30–
40 years. As stated by the country’s President Xi Jinping, China therefore 
aims in the next 40 years to “build a moderately prosperous society in all 
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respects” by 2021 – which marks the centenary of the Communist Party 
of China – and to “build a modern socialist country that is prosperous, 
strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious” by 2049, a date 
that marks the centenary of the People’s Republic of China itself. Within 
this scope, the Initiative contains both political and economic goals for 
China.
From this perspective, it is also necessary to evaluate China’s security and 
energy interests, its opening of new markets and reducing transportation 
costs in foreign trade with Europe. According to the above, China is trying 
to attain four basic goals through the Belt and Road Initiative. First, 
China aims to accelerate the growth and development of its economy 
by enabling the spread of economic development globally through 
infrastructural investments and the opening of new trade routes. Second, 
China strives to secure its foreign trade by improving its relationships of 
interdependence with other countries/regions through global networks 
and partnerships. Third, through the Belt and Road Initiative, China 
will be given the opportunity to focus on Asia as a part of the Initiative. 
Fourth, China endeavours to ensure the internationalization of Chinese 
currency renminbi (RMB), or the yuan, by promoting its use in fi nancial 
transactions. Thanks to the Initiative, China will be able to further develop 
its economic, political, and cultural relations with the countries along the 
Initiative’s various trade routes. The People’s Republic of China, which is 
set to become a global power, will have the opportunity to exercise a more 
powerful voice in the world arena through the Initiative.
On the other hand, China’s soft power policy operates as an alternative 
to the hard policies pursued by other global powers concerning countries 
situated on the New Silk Road.8 For example, China will use the 
Initiative to increase its economic, commercial, and political relations and 
cooperation with those Central and Eastern European countries involved 
in the Initiative. Thanks to these relations and cooperation, China has 
the opportunity to apply soft power policies in Central and Eastern 
Europe, making China’s cultural diplomacy a most important tool. In this 
framework, the long-term goal of Chinese cultural diplomacy is to create 
a good image of China among the people of Central and Eastern Europe, 
and then spread it to the Western and Northern Europe.
In this sense the New Silk Road project makes China a country in 
pursuit of a global vision. In addition, the Belt and Road Initiative 
8  I. Krastev, M. Leonard, New World Order: The Balance of Soft Power and the Rise 
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provides China with an opportune environment in which it can 
gradually increase its economic power, using its investment policies 
and transforming its political infl uence so that is more globally effective 
through the establishment of new relationships. Additionally, Beijing has 
become the centre of attraction for Eurasia due to the construction of 
new transportation routes and economic corridors, making the Initiative 
a comprehensive international initiative.
Therefore, it is necessary to consider and evaluate the One Belt One 
Road Initiative within the aforementioned frameworks. Chinese President 
Xi Jinping announced the Modern Silk Road Project for the fi rst time in 
a speech he gave on September 7, 2013 at the Nazarbayev University in 
Kazakhstan. In his speech, Xi stressed China’s hope to co-build the “Silk 
Road Economic Belt” through the development of a cooperative model 
with a creative spirit in order to further intensify economic connections 
among all Eurasian countries, deepening mutual cooperation and 
broadening the horizon for development. Xi Jinping then referred to the 
project as “One Belt One Road” Initiative,9 whereby the Initiative got 
its name by combining and abbreviating the names of the historical “Silk 
Road Economic Belt” and the modern “Sea Silk Road”. The Chinese 
government then set up the Leading Group for Promoting the Belt 
and Road Initiative, with an administrative offi ce under the National 
Development and Reform Commission. In March 2015, the Chinese 
government published Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road 
Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Subsequently, in 
May 2017, the fi rst Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation 
was convened in Beijing.10 On May 14, 2017, the opening ceremony of 
the “Belt and Road Forum” was held at the China National Convention 
Center in Beijing Olympic Park; the ceremony was attended by 29 heads 
of state and government, as well as over 1,500 delegates from 130 countries 
and 70 international organizations.11
The Initiative aims to establish a trade and infrastructure network 
by connecting Europe and Africa to Asia and includes two main trade 
routes: The New Silk Road Economic Belt, and the 21st Century Maritime 
9  President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road 
Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries, 2013.09.07, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_
eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml (access 8.04.2020).
10  The Belt and Road Initiative Progress, Contributions and Prospects, http://www.
china-un.ch/eng/zywjyjh/t1675564.htm (access 9.04.2020).
11  Full text of President Xi’s speech at opening of Belt and Road forum, http://www.
xinhuanet.com//english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm (access 9.04.2020).
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Silk Road. The New Maritime Silk Road itself comprises two routes: one 
which passes through the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, and the 
Indian Ocean, reaching Europe through Southeast Asia, South Asia, West 
Asia, and North Africa (via the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea);12 and 
a second route, which crosses the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the 
Sea of Japan reaching the Korean Peninsula and the Far East regions of 
Japan and Russia. These routes serve as a channel for deepening economic 
and commercial cooperation as well as enriching and developing cultural 
ties between China and those countries along the route. As well as being 
transportation corridors, these routes furthermore envisage the economic 
integration of those countries on the New Silk Road into China. Within 
this framework, the Initiative includes fi ve basic construction areas. The 
fi rst is based on integrating transportation systems. For this purpose, 
and the project has been planned for the development and integration 
of railways, highways, airlines, and ports. Thus, the project is expected 
to reduce China’s current dependence on seaways.13 The second aims to 
increase the infrastructural capacities of cities with the development and 
integration of internal markets. The third basic construction area targets 
the common operation and use of energy and natural resources; the project 
can be used to diversity those energy resources that are needed by China 
but that are currently owned by countries in Central Asia and the Middle 
East, increasing interdependence among these countries and raising their 
voices for the management of energy resources. Additionally, China, which 
has an excess capacity in many sectors, from steel to cement, will also have 
the opportunity to market its surpluses more easily thanks to the increased 
connectivity offered by the Initiative. The fourth concerns the establishment 
and the operation of organized industrial zones and agricultural-production 
farms. Another important purpose of the New Maritime Silk Road is to set 
up development projects that are in line with the needs of those countries 
along the route.14 Therefore, China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road project 
is based on a broad, comprehensive, and transboundary cooperation across 
several fi elds, from “infrastructure-oriented collaborations to development- 
and production-oriented collaborations.
12  R. Zhang, S. Yu, The Challenge to Maritime Silk Road and Port Connectivity, in: 
The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Challenges and Opportunities for Asia and Europe, 
eds. K. Zou, S. Wu, Q. Ye, Routledge, London 2019, p. 15.
13  E. Oziewicz, J. Bednarz, Challenges and opportunities of the Maritime Silk Road 
initiative for EU countries, “Scientifi c Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin”, 
no. 59(131)/2019, pp. 110–119.
14  J. Holslag, How China’s New Silk Road Threatens European Trade, “The Interna-
tional Spectator”, vol. 52, no. 1/2017, pp. 48–51.
129
E. Akdemir, Chinese Strategy Towards Europe…
On the other hand, the historical Silk Road only offered intercontinental 
transportation via land. However, the One Belt One Road Initiative enables 
trade through land, sea, and air transportation routes. Accordingly, many 
countries involved in the Initiative have signed agreements in the trans-
portation, cargo, infrastructure, energy, communication, customs, software, 
economy and commerce, industrial production, e-commerce, and maritime 
fi elds. Within this framework, the concept of ‘belt’ was used to express the 
nature of the roads, railways, oil and gas pipelines, and other infrastructure 
investments involved by the Initiative. The Initiative means the creation of 
a transportation network that extends from China to Venice through Cen-
tral Asia and Moscow. Rather than incorporating a single route, the Initia-
tive plans several corridors of transportation from Asia to Europe:
– China–Mongolia–Russia
– New Eurasia Land Bridge
– China–Bangladesh–India–Myanmar
– China–Central and West Asia
– China–Indochinese Peninsula
– China–Pakistan.
The concept of ‘road’ is used to refer the Initiative’s maritime transport 
network: a planned transportation network that comprises the Initiative’s 
maritime line, and that will extend from South and Southeast Asia to 
East Africa and the north of the Mediterranean Sea. The emphasis of this 
seaway route is on the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the gulfs 
of the Middle East.
The Belt and Road Initiative extends across the continents of Asia, Europe 
and Africa, connecting the vibrant East Asian economic environment to 
the advanced European economy, while also providing countries on the 
route with enormous potential regarding their economic development.
As stated above, the Initiative plans to integrate into the global econo-
my those countries that are situated along its route, and to provide capital 
fl ow to these countries, thereby increasing their employment opportuni-
ties. A total of 65 countries are involved in the Initiative, organized accord-
ing to region:
East Asia: China, Mongolia.
Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam.
Central Asia:Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan.
Middle East and North Africa: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Syria, United 
Arab Emirates, Yemen.
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South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
Europe: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine.
Economic and Geopolitical Effects 
of the Belt and Road Initiative
The main sources of funding for the One Belt One Road Initiative are 
the Chinese development banks, the USD 40 billion Silk Road Fund, and 
large state-owned commercial banks. China Exim Bank also supports 1,000 
projects in 49 economies worth USD 80 billion.15 Through the use of these 
funding resources, it is estimated that the Belt and Road Initiative investment 
projects, which aim to establish a transportation, industry, and trade network 
between China, Asia, Africa, and Europe, will add over USD 1 trillion of 
outward funding for foreign infrastructure over a 10-year period, starting 
in 2017.16 It should be highlighted at this point that most of those countries 
included in the Modern Silk Road Project are less developed or developing 
countries. Therefore, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s announcement that 
public fi rms and fi nancial institutions will be given incentives to launch 
and run infrastructure and construction projects outside China increases 
the appetite of both undeveloped or developing countries regarding the 
Initiative, therefore promoting China’s role in the global economic system. 
According to this aim, China has signed agreements worth USD 30 billion 
with Kazakhstan, USD 15 billion with Uzbekistan, and USD 3 billion 
with Kyrgyzstan to help these countries develop their infrastructure and 
meet fi nancial expenses relating to the Belt and Road projects.17 China also 
provided USD 1.4 billion of funding to the Port City Colombo in Sri Lanka.18 
15  China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Land-
scape, “OECO Business and Finance Outlook 2018”, p. 20, https://www.oecd.org/fi nance/
Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-fi nance-landscape.
pdf (access 9.04.2020).
16  China’s new silk route The long and winding road, “PwC’s Growth Markets Cen-
tre”, February 2016, p. 4, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/growth-markets-center/assets/pdf/
china-new-silk-route.pdf (access 9.04.2020).
17  R. Pantucci, S. Lain, III. The Plan: Infrastructure and Integration, “Whitehall Pa-
pers”, no. 88.1/2016, p. 30.
18  Sri Lanka’s ‘new Dubai’: will Chinese-built city suck the life out of Colombo?, 
2 August 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/aug/02/sri-lanka-new-dubai-
chinese-city-colombo (access 7.04.2020).
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The Initiative has seen USD 200 billion investment agreements having 
been signed unto the present date; of these, the largest project so far is 
the USD 68 billion China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, which connects 
China to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.19 These investments have enabled the 
Initiative to become more concrete, increasing its recognition not only 
in less developed or developing countries among the leading countries of 
Europe and Asia.
The Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), which was 
launched within the scope of the Initiative, offi cially started its operations 
in 2016. The Bank has 54 founding members, including the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries, four G7 countries 
(the UK, France, Italy, Germany), and several other countries, such as 
Egypt, Australia, and New Zealand. Today the number of members of 
the AIIB is 78.20 Thus, China has largely eliminated shortages of those 
resources that can be used to continuously increase its investments in 
those countries that lie on the routes of the Initiative. According to data 
compiled by the AIIB, since its establishment, the Bank has funded a total 
of USD 13.45 billion of investment.21
As a result, it is necessary that the Belt and Road Initiative is evaluated 
within this framework, specifi cally, Beijing’s desire to assume the position 
of a global actor within a changing and developing international system. 
The EU, which is increasingly involved in the discussion about being 
a global actor or a regional economic unity, must improve its relations with 
China for protection, and also to ensure its current and future economic and 
political power. As stated above, the EU strongly discourages its members 
from holding bilateral institutional relations with China. This is because 
its members might lose power to China if they act alone. Therefore, while 
Brussels is sceptical of Beijing, it has nevertheless taken steps to improve 
its relations with China, provided that its members act as a union. The 
EU–China summits, which have already held over 20 times, increased 
mutual convergence. At this point it should be taken into account that the 
attitudes and policies of Donald Trump, President of the USA, also affect 
the EU’s approach to China.
19  China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative, January 28, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative (access 7.04.2020).
20  https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/list/index.html?status=Approved (access 7.04.2020).
21  https://www.aiib.org/en/index.html (access 7.04.2020).
132
Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 2/2020
Concerns of the European Union Countries 
about the Initiative
Western states, especially the USA, are concerned that China is trying 
to increase its global infl uence by allocating billions of Yuan investment 
projects, and thereby causing high borrowing costs in developing 
countries. In this way, the United States shares the concern of some 
in Asia that the BRI could be a Trojan horse for China-led regional 
development and military expansion.22 The USA has also accused China 
of using the BRI to drag developing countries into a debt trap offering 
these countries cheap loans in order to force them to sell their important 
assets. For example, Sri Lanka, which could not make certain loan 
repayments in 2017, sold a port to China, which had fi nanced the port’s 
construction.23
China’s New Silk Road project has also caused controversy within the 
EU. While on the one hand EU countries praise the vision of the Chinese 
government concerning the Belt and Road Initiative, they also demand that 
China opens its markets to increase bilateral trade on the other. As discussed 
in the previous chapters of the study, this EU demand overlaps with China’s 
goals of developing its own domestic markets and increasing its urban 
infrastructure capacity by integrating its cities with the outside world.
EU members who are included in China’s Initiative are Italy, Greece, 
Czechia, Poland, and Hungary, while those who are excluded, such as 
Germany, France and Spain, prefer to work with China in the capacity 
of the EU. In this respect, the countries that do not participate in the 
Initiative criticize the countries that have made agreements with China. 
Another concern of these countries is that China’s policies are pursued 
with the aim of making EU countries more economically dependent on 
China through various means. It should be noted, however, that the states 
advocating this view allow Chinese capital to be used to take over European 
fi rms, especially German fi rms, thereby increasing their effectiveness on 
the European stage,24 as Germany is the leading country to receive the 
most investment in the company merger and acquisition fi eld. A total 
22  A. Chatzky, J. McBride, China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative, Council on For-
eign Relations https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative 
(access 15.05.2020).
23  D. Brautigam, A critical look at Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy’: the rise of a meme, 
“Area Development and Policy”, vol. 5, no 1/2020, pp. 1–14.
24  Chinesische Unternehmenskäufe in Europa: Eine Analyse von M&A-Deals 2006–
2016, January 2017, p. 10, https://jb-partners.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/EY-ma-
chinesische-investoren-januar-2017.pdf (access 12.04.2020).
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of value of 22.7 billion euros was invested in German companies – in 
addition to 14.4 billion euros in France and 4.6 billion euros in Spain 
– in 2000–2019.25 Despite this several infrastructure investment projects 
have been carried out in many EU countries through Chinese direct 
investments, operations, and lending facilities within the scope of the 
Initiative. Numerous highways, ports, and airports are built, operated 
or purchased by Chinese companies along the routes of the Initiative. 
However, takeovers of modern companies and the high investment 
presence of China on the European continent to some extent, “woke up” 
the EU institutions and the authorities of individual Member States.26
This “awakening” is closely related to the possible effects of Chinese 
capital on the EU’s employment market. The EU anticipates that a total 
of EU citizens between 64,000 and 211,000 can lose their jobs if cheap 
goods originating from China have easier access to the EU market.27 This 
estimate increases to between 1.7 and 3.5 million job losses when indirect 
job losses are taken into account.28 Reports published by European think 
tanks on the subject state that Chinese companies are able to make huge 
investments in the EU due to their state support, but that this can never 
be true for EU-based competitor fi rms. Consequently, they emphasize that 
this clearly contradicts the principle of reciprocity. If the concentration 
of Chinese companies operating in the EU increases, fair trade conditions 
will disappear completely because Chinese companies have very low 
operating and production costs compared with those of European 
companies. Furthermore, the intellectual property rights of EU companies 
involved in the EU–China bilateral trade relationship present another 
issue of concern for the EU; this is because European companies coming 
to China are forced to grant ownership or usage rights of their technology 
to domestic Chinese entities. Consequently, measures to protect the EU 
market against the increasingly concentrated Chinese capital in the EU, 
as well as the conditions under which these measures are implemented, 
are increasingly debated by the EU. This raises the question of whether 
25  A. Kratz, M. Huotari, T. Hanemann, R. Arcesati, op. cit., p. 11.
26  B.J. Góralczyk, Poland on the Route of the Chinese Silk Road: A Chance for 
Development or Just a Challenge?, “Monographies”, Faculty of Management Univer-
sity of Warsaw, 2018, http://www.wz.uw.edu.pl/portaleFiles/6133-wydawnictwo-/new_
structrural_2018/Bogdan_J._Goralczyk.pdf (access 14.05.2020)
27  Change in the methodology for anti-dumping investigations concerning China, 
“European Commission”, 2016 February, p. 5, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/
february/tradoc_154241.pdf (access 12.04.2020).
28  R.E. Scott, X. Jiang, Unilateral grant of market economy status to China would put 
millions of EU jobs at risk, “Economic Policy Institute”, September, 2015, https://www.
epi.org/publication/eu-jobs-at-risk/ (access 12.04.2020).
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the Belt and Road Initiative is a window of opportunity for the EU, or 
whether the Initiative really carries the threat of a “siege”.
Chinese Strategy Towards Europe
China is trying to become a global leader in international politics 
by using its economic power. It is therefore of great importance to the 
development of its commercial and economic relations with the EU, while 
also trying to exclude confl icting EU viewpoints from these bilateral 
relations. It should be emphasized here that China is sending messages to 
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the USA by developing its economic and commercial relations with the 
EU. Considering that the USA is animportant geopolitical actor of Asia, 
its most important message to the US is that China is now an important 
actor in Europe, suggesting that there can be no Europe without China.
For China, the EU’s importance extends beyond that of a commercial 
and economic partner; the position of the EU can also be used as a tool 
or a bridge to improve China’s relations with the West. As a result, China 
has created the perception of the USA as being an “other” or an “enemy”, 
something that is not true regarding the EU and its member states. The 
Chinese government, which is aware of this situation, plans to continue 
its mutually benefi cial commercial and economic relations with the EU, 
and to further increase its own political and economic confi dence by 
progressing its general foreign policy and trading process through the 
Belt and Road Initiative. In fact, it is essential forChina to maintain its 
positive relations with Europe in order to achieve its 2049 goals. Western 
capital has an indispensable importance for China if it is realizes its goals, 
and therefore China is seeking to make Western capital more dependent 
on its own economy.
On the other hand, as mentioned earlier in the study, due to the actions 
of Western powers which resulted in the “century-long humiliation – 
something that is still fresh in the memory of many Chinese – it should 
also be taken into account that China may have turned this mentality into 
a policy of vengeance. Moreover, today China is patiently expecting to 
become an important global power in the world by coexisting alongside 
the same current global economic, political, and cultural system imposed 
by Western capitalist countries. China intends to do this without isolating 
itself from such a system, even trying to integrate into this system from 
time to time; in other words, China wants to stick to the ‘rules of the 
game’. Accordingly, its relations with the EU have a vital role and 
importance. The “Goodwill Agreement” signed within the scope of the 
Belt and Road Initiative between China and EU-member Italy, in March 
2019, serves as an important example of the aforementioned process. In 
fact, by this agreement, Italy became the fi rst G-7 country to support the 
New Silk Road project, which itself carries an important message sent by 
China to Western countries. On the other hand, Western sources claim 
that China is seeking to infi ltrate Western Europe by using Italy in this 
regard, a country that has been living in its 3rd stationary period for the 
past decade, something that suggests that China’s message was indeed 
delivered to the West as intended. A second message that China may wish 
to send in this regard is that, rather than causing all EU countries to unite 
against it, instead those with whom it has good bilateral relations will 
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be economically rewarded, and that those who oppose China’s economic 
interests and huge domestic market will be deprived accordingly. In fact, it 
is easy to predict how other EU member states will respond to this message. 
In this respect, we can say that, currently at least, China has started to 
apply the principle of “divide and rule” – an important political approach 
of the West – in the EU, a heart of the West. China is not solely interested 
in Italy within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative; Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEECs) are the main EU countries 
geographical regions to which China has attached great importance and 
focus in recent years. On the other hand, according to Zuoku the CEE 
region, as a region of great geographical importance in Europe and one 
of the most concentrated regions in terms of transportation routes in the 
Eurasian continent, has played a crucial role in the connectivity between 
China and Europe. CEECs need to carry out cooperation with China by 
using their geographical advantages to realize economic catching-up.29
The “17 + 1” Cooperation Platform 
under the Belt and Road Initiative
CEECs refers to a group of countries in Central Europe, Southeast 
Europe, Northern Europe, and Eastern Europe including former 
European states of the ‘Soviet Block’. After the collapse of the Iron 
Curtain in 1989–90, this term was used to refer to a total of 16 states within 
this geographical region: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany (Eastern 
Germany), Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, and Serbia. This 16 + 1 cooperation between these 16 CEECs 
and China started as a Chinese government initiative aimed at promoting 
business and investment relations between the 16 countries specifi cally 
within the framework of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.30
Subsequently, with the offi cial participation of Greece in the China–
CEEC cooperation in April 2019, the name of the cooperation model was 
changed from “16 + 1” to “17 + 1” to refl ect Greece’s inclusion. The 
inclusion of Greece in this cooperation was very important for China 
because Greece’s participation will extend the 21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road to European–Asian trade. Greece’s participation as a Western 
29  L. Zuokui, Europe and the “Belt and Road” Initiative: Responses and Risks, Coop-
eration and Development Institute, http://cdinstitute.eu/web/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/
Liu%20Zuokui%20-%20Europe%20and%20the%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative.
pdf (access 14.05.2020).
30  https://www.ceec-china-croatia.org/en/about-cooperation/ (access 12.04.2020).
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European country and a China–CEEC observer since 2016, will be the 
key by which Chinese-led initiatives will be able to demonstrate the 
Initiative’s compatibility with Western systems, thereby leading to a more 
integrated Eurasian economy. Hungary was the fi rst European country to 
sign a memorandum of understanding with China on the promotion of 
the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.
China considers the CEECs to comprise the crossroads of communication 
and cooperation between Asia and Europe within the framework of the 
Belt and Road Initiative. China also considers these countries as important 
markets with growth potential, and so it plans to develop and deepen its 
cooperation with CEECs through the Belt and Road Initiative while also 
making CEECs an important part of China–Europe relations. Considering 
China’s approach to make EU members more dependent on China, the 
value of Europe and European countries regarding the realization of 
China’s general national strategy on the global stage becomes clear. China 
therefore intends to develop economic and trade-based cooperation with 
the 16 CEECs within this context. Furthermore, Beijing not only perceives 
the CEE region as one of several new frontiers for export expansion, but 
also as a strategic entry point into the wider European market. China chose 
this region because CEE countries have more dynamic, largely developed, 
less-saturated economies that are directly connected to the EU’s common 
market.31 The underlying reason behind this intention is in parallel with 
those discussed for Western European countries in previous sections. For 
instance, Chinese investment in these countrieswould further strengthen 
the cooperation between China and CEECs, turning the whole region into 
Chinese hub for trade with Europe. China’s approach towards cooperating 
with CEECs also serves the interest of the CEEs themselves. Institutional 
relations and collaborations between China and CEECs take place on 
the “17 + 1” Platform.32 On April 25, 2012, the second China–CEECs 
Economic & Trade Forum took place in Warsaw, Poland. One day layer, 
the leaders of China and the CEECs had their fi rst meeting in Warsaw in 
the frame of the China–CEEC partnership.33
The parties, who meet annually for China–CEEC summits at the ‘heads 
of government’ level,34 have decided to remain in close and constant co-
31  Á. Szunomár, One Belt, One Road: Connecting China with Central and Eastern 
Europe?, in: The Belt and Road Initiative in The Global Arena: Chinese and European 
Perspectives, eds. Y. Cheng, L. Song, L. Huang, Singapore, 2018, p. 78.
32  http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/ (access 12.04.2020).
33  http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/msc_1/dsj/t1410557.htm (access 11.04.2020).
34  The 16 + 1 countries meet annually at the Heads of Government level. So far eight 
summits were held: 2012 – Warsaw, Poland, 2013 – Bucharest, Romania, 2014 – Belgrade, 
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operation concerning mutual political trust, economic and commercial 
collaboration, and cultural contacts. Another important mutual decision 
that was made during the fi rst summit was when the members decided to 
intensify their high-level visits. Considering the relationships developed 
after the summit, the “16 + 1” cooperation platform brought tangible 
benefi ts to both China and the 16 CEECs, whereby all parties received 
technology and fi nancial support from one another. The completion of 
a thermal power plant in Bosnia Herzegovina and the progress of a railway 
project35 in Hungary–Serbia, which were facilitated by the investments of 
Chinese companies, are both important examples of that and should be 
mentioned at this point. This railway line, which extends across for 166 
km in Hungary and 184 km in Serbia, extends from the Baltic Sea in the 
north to the port of Piraeus in Greece in the south. This Hungary–Serbia 
railway line is expected to meet the increasing logistics and transportation 
demands within the region. Accordingly, the railway project has potential 
to improve the economic development environment of CEE by directly 
increasing employment and investments in the region. A total of eight 
China–CEEC summits have been held thus far, with the 8th summit being 
held on 12 April 2019 in Dubrovnik, Croatia. Two important decisions 
were made at the 8th summit with the aim of strengthening China–CEEC 
planning and coordination, and to support China in hosting the 9th Chi-
na–CEEC summit, which is scheduled for 2020.36 Another institutional 
structuring of the 17 + 1 cooperation is the China-Central and Eastern 
European Countries Economic and Trade Forum. The China–CEEC In-
ter-Bank Association was established at the end of 2017 at the initiative 
of the China Development Bank (CDB). There are 14 development and 
commercial banks in the China–CEEC Interbank Association, including 
the BDB, China Development Bank, and banks from Czechia, Croatia, 
Slovenia, Montenegro, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Hungary, Romania 
and Serbia.37 The purpose of the Association is to establish effective coop-
eration between the People’s Republic of China and those CEECs aiming 
Serbia, 2015 – Suzhou, China, 2016 – Riga, Latvia, 2017 – Budapest, Hungary, 2018 – 
Sofi a, Bulgaria, 2019 – Dubrovnik, Croatia.
35  The train journey from Belgrade to Budapest currently takes about 8 hours, which 
will be reduced to 3 hours after the reconstruction of the railway line between these two 
cities.
36  The Dubrovnik Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern 
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to strengthen economic and fi nancial interaction among the Association’s 
members, as well as to foster economic development, export, and invest-
ment.38 At this point, small and medium-sized enterprises constitute the 
Association’s cooperation. China plans to increase the visibility of the New 
Silk Road by intensifying its cooperation with small and medium-sized en-
terprises in Central and Eastern Europe. The 8th Economic China–CEEC 
Economic and Trade Forum of was held in Sofi a, Bulgaria, in July 2018. At 
the Forum, Chinese Prime Minister Li invited various fi nancial institu-
tions from CEECs to set up branch offi ces in China for business, and called 
for upgrading local cooperation between the regional cities in CEECs and 
China and for stepping up cultural and people-to-people exchanges be-
tween the two sides. The Chinese Prime Minister also stressed that the 
16 + 1 cooperation should always follow common international rules, in-
cluding World Trade Organization regulations, and relevant EU legal and 
regulatory frameworks. Pointing out that China attaches great importance 
to its cooperation with CEECs, Chinese Prime Minister Li then went on 
to explain trade volume between China and the 16 CEECs grew to almost 
USD 70 billion from USD 40 billion, increasing an average of 6.5% annu-
ally during the 2012–2018 period. Prime Minister Li also pointed out that 
the share of China’s trade with these countries in relation to its trade with 
Europe as a whole increased from 9.3% to 11%, and that China’s imports 
from these countries increased by 25% in the same period.39
The fi rst China–CEECs Expo and International Consumer Goods Fair 
was held in June 2019.40 According to China, this platform will focus on 
economic and trade cooperation followinga theme that aims to “Deepen 
Opening up and Cooperation for a Win-win Situation”, and to strive to build 
a platform for comprehensive exchange and cooperation among China and 
CEECs. Consequently, these meetings and cooperation mechanisms – held 
at various levels – promote cooperation between the parties at a practical 
level, deepening the commercial cooperation between China and CEECs 
and introducing many products of regional countries into the daily lives 
of Chinese people. Within this context, China is therefore able to bring 
quality products from CEECs and offer them to consumers in China at low 
prices. Agriculture and dairy products can be given as examples here.
Additionally, Chinese companies invest in many fi elds in CEEC in-
cluding those of machinery, chemical industry, telecommunications, white 
goods, renewable energy, logistics, winter sports, research and development, 
38  https://ceec-china-sme.org/hbor-hosts-the-meeting-of-the-china-ceec-interbank-asso-
ciation/ (access 12.04.2020).
39  http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/08/c_137309738.htm (access 12.04.2020).
40  https://www.cceecexpo.org/site_en/ (access 12.04.2020).
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fi nance and agriculture, and the service sector. To maintain this momentum, 
the China–CEE Fund stepped up its commitment from USD 425 million in 
2013 to USD 1 billion in 2017. According to current data, Chinese direct for-
eign investments in the 17 CEECs increased in the 2013–2018 period, and 
its foreign direct investment stock in these same countries reached a total of 
USD 2.5 billion in 2018.41 China plans to establish a China–Europe logistics 
chain and a business cooperation zone so that these data will be available in 
the long-term future. Chinese cities are effectively linked to the cities and 
ports of Western Europe countries and those of CEECs through rail and 
road networks and high-speed train projects.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the distribution of investments 
within the 16 + 1 grouping is uneven; according to the data, just six 
CEEC countries – Bulgaria, the Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Romania – account for 95% of all 16 + 1 investment.42
On the other hand, another area that has been infl uenced by the Initia-
tive is that of cultural communication between China and CEECs. China 
promotes cultural diplomacy in order to convince the international pub-
lic that the idea of One Belt One Road Initiative carries the same spirit as 
that of the ancient Silk Road; a spirit that is based on mutual trust, equal-
ity, mutual benefi t, comprehensiveness, mutual learning, and mutually 
benefi cial cooperation. It also promotes such diplomacy to gain the trust 
of Western European states by trying to create a “good image” for China. 
Such an effective cultural diplomacy toward CEE countries may serve as 
the breaking point regarding China’s cultural diplomacy to be carried out 
across Europe in general, but especially in Western European countries.43 
In this regard, it is extremely important for China to implement its cul-
tural diplomacy strategy effectively and correctly in Central and Eastern 
European countries. In this respect, China considers Central and Eastern 
European countries as a “bridge” between the parties to demonstrate and 
prove through cultural diplomacy that China is not a threat to the EU. 
China has initiated a series of cultural diplomatic activities for Central 
41  Central and Eastern Europe: From 16 + 1 to 17 + 1, https://hkmb.hktdc.com/
en/1X0AJYOI/hktdc-research/Central-and-Eastern-Europe-From-161-to-171 (access 
14.04.2020).
42  A. Kizeková, China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the 16 + 1 Platform: The Case 
of the Czech Republic, in: Securing the Belt and Road Initiative Risk Assessment, Private 
Security and Special Insurances Along the New Wave of Chinese Outbound Investments, 
eds. A. Arduino, X. Gong, Singapore 2018, p. 283.
43  L. Song, Z. Qiqi, A Model for the Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Cultural Diplo-
macy Toward Central and Eastern European Countries, in: The Belt and Road Initiative in 
The Global Arena: Chinese and European Perspectives, eds. Y. Cheng, L. Song, L. Huang, 
Singapore 2018, p. 56.
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and Eastern European countries to achieve these goals. Media, trade, cul-
tural exhibitions, education and exchange programs, and town twinning 
are among the cultural diplomacy activities to improve the Chinese na-
tional image in Central and Eastern European countries. Communication 
channels such as press, broadcasting, radio, television, fi lm and internet 
are widely used by China to improve the Chinese national image in Cen-
tral and Central European countries and change the negative perceptions 
about the country. For example, China Radio International (CRI) broad-
casts in seven languages, including Czech, Serbian, Romanian, Albanian, 
Bulgarian, Hungarian and Polish. At the same time, CRI’s online web-
site publishes various political, economic and cultural aspects of China 
in Central and Eastern European country languages.44 China Council 
for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) leads China’s cultural 
diplomacy in trade by organizing local exhibitions and fairs in various 
CEEC cities in order to introduce China to local people. China’s cultural 
diplomacy activities also include Chinese cultural festivals, including 
the Chinese Culture Festival Concert, Exhibition of Contemporary Art 
and Ink Painting, and China Film Week, in Poland, Bulgaria, and other 
CEECs. The Chinese government has also opened Confucius Institutes 
and Courses in 16 CEECs and provides scholarships to 1,000 students 
from these countries to learn Chinese in China. The Chinese government 
also provides scholarships to 5,000 students from these countries who 
want to study in China. Furthermore, there are more than 100 “sister 
cities” agreements between China and all the CEEC countries, except-
ing Montenegro and Estonia. The number of traditional Chinese medical 
treatment centres has also increased in several CEECs. As a result, the 
Belt and Road Initiative provides China with an opportunity to conduct 
cultural diplomacy activities in Central and Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, according to some opinions, so far, the response 
of the CEE countries to the Chinese strategy and initiatives has been 
lukewarm. Different business cultures and mentalities, and constraints 
on China from EU rules and regulations, intellectual property rights and 
human rights are among the main reasons for this lukewarm feeling. 
Another important point here is that, according to some opinions, the 
countries of the CEE region have never come together to form a single 
political community. What they need to do is to fi nd common ground for 
a joint approach to China.45
44  http://chinaplus.cri.cn/ (access 14.04.2020).
45  B.J. Góralczyk, China’s interests in Central and Eastern Europe: enter the drag-
on, “European View”, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2017, https://www.
ce.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ev-china.pdf (access 14.05.2020).
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Conclusions
China, which has the second largest economy in the world, is gradually 
increasing its infl uence – globally, but particularly on the European 
continent – through the use of the Belt and Road Initiative. This has 
been achieved with the opening of new economic areas of infl uence along 
the route of the Initiative. The Initiative will not only promote economic 
development among China’s cooperating countries, but it will also deepen 
mutual cultural, political, and social cooperation and contacts between 
China and other countries included in the Initiative. Nevertheless, China 
still needs the support of the EU and its members to achieve its regional 
and global goals, as well as to execute its strategic plans. Accordingly, 
China intends to consolidate its economic, political, and cultural relations 
both with the EU and the CEECs in line with its goals. It should be noted, 
however, that the EU’s doubts and suspicions regarding the Belt and Road 
Initiative have not yet been completely eliminated.
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